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Abstract 
This paper aims at measuring scales of the audit committee diligence for audit committees or for other 
governance organ concerned with the audit committee diligence. The conception and the validation of this 
measurement scales were done on the Tunisian ground. To construct a measure of audit committee diligence, we 
adopted the Churchill’s approach [18]. That is based on data collected from qualitative and quantitative surveys. 
The principal component analysis (PCA) on each of the audit committee diligence emerges many axes among 
the diligence items revealed by Tunisian internal auditors. After that, a confirmatory analysis (CFA) aimed at 
helping us to validate the proposed model.  
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
* Corresponding author.  
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Accordingly this approach developed a scale of 11diligence indicators distributed on two factors. 
Keywords: Audit committee diligence; audit committee meetings; audit committee self-assessment; measuring 
scale; Churchill’s approach. 
1. Introduction 
There has been an increasing recognition of the importance of audit committees. In fact, audit committees are 
not only considered as an important mechanism for strengthening the corporate governance of companies, which 
primary objective is to  increase the credibility of financial statements but also for assisting directors in meeting 
their responsibilities and enhancing audit independence [38]. Indeed, an effective audit committee maintains and 
establishes lines of communication between the board and the company’s independent auditors, internal 
auditors, and financial management. The audit committee expect internal auditing to examine and evaluate the 
adequacy and effectiveness of the organization’s system of internal control and the quality of performance in 
carrying out assigned responsibilities. 
The audit committee effectiveness depends on the diligence and skill of its members ([6,21,47]). Audit 
committee diligence is crucial in determining the ability of audit committee in carrying out its responsibilities 
effectively [25]. Reference [17] Asserts that diligence is the process factor that is needed to achieve audit 
committee effectiveness 
Reference [19] suggested that the power needs the will to act. Perception of the diligence of the Audit 
Committee is derived from the will of the members of the audit committee to act and perform their monitoring 
function. Prior U.S. research finds that the more active audit committees have the more effective controls on 
earnings management and restatements [3,29]. For their part, Reference [33] reported that the diligence of the 
Audit Committee is a major component of its effectiveness. Moreover, Reference [47: 102] explained the 
diligence with the phrase "I want to be effective." 
Several researchers have also employed the number of annual audit committee meetings as a proxy for audit 
committee diligence [25,9,44,28,17,37]. Reference [17] argued that audit committee diligence as appreciated by 
the number of annual meetings is reflected in the effort invested by the committee in its oversight duties. Audit 
committees that meet more frequently are more likely to become aware of financial reporting issues that may 
ultimately affect the quality of reported earnings [34]. 
The frequency of audit committee meetings constitutes a potential indicator of audit committee effectiveness 
[25]. But it is not the only indicator. The focus of this study is to carry an examination of the audit committee 
diligence and to refine the traditionally used audit committee diligence measures [38]. Measuring audit 
committee diligence is a difficult task for researchers and regulators [52]. Called meeting frequency cannot be 
expected to adequately capture the time and effort expended by audit committee members. It is suggested that 
by replacing the proxy for audit committee member’s diligence, the measurement of audit committee diligence 
can be improved. Our study is unique, in that we build and validate measurement scales of the audit committee 
diligence on the Tunisian ground. We were inspired of paradigm of Churchill [18] in purpose to design this 
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measurement scales. This measuring instrument would be of a particular utility to the boards which try to 
estimate audit committee diligence. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section two provides literature review on audit committee 
diligence. Followed by a section explaining the empirical step of the search. Section IV discusses the empirical 
results and the final section provides conclusions of the study. 
2. Audit committee diligence measurement indicators  
Over the last decades, few studies were interested to measure audit committee diligence [25,9,44,50,31,17,46,3]. 
The majority of these previous studies evaluated the audit committee diligence on the basis of the number of 
annual meetings. We consider that the audit committee diligence can be approached by several indicators such 
as:   
• The Meeting Frequency and duration 
• The planning of the works and the quality of the returned reports 
• The audit committee self-assessment 
• The risk of "overload" 
2.1. Meeting Frequency and duration  
Researchers have generally used the number of annual audit committee meetings as a tool for diligence of audit 
committee [30,29,1,22,39,23,53]. Reference [17] attributed this trend to the absence of the other quantitative 
metrics of the diligence. Reference [26,11] showed that the number of audit committee meetings is the only 
available quantitative signal about the diligence of audit committees. Some regulators have emphasised the need 
for frequent meetings of the audit committee. Reference [1] argued that audit committee diligence used the 
number of annual meetings is reflected in the effort invested by the committee in its oversight duties.  
Such focus on audit committee meetings is due to the concept that frequent audit meetings potentially allow 
better communication between directors and auditors, and enable the audit committee to be more effective [4]. 
One can notice that the Audit committees who meet more frequently are more likely to become aware of 
financial reporting issues that may ultimately affect the quality of reported earnings. Also, prior research 
indicactes that when audit committee frequently few financial reporting problems and fraud can exist 
[9,37,29,6]. 
Correspondingly, Reference [25] stated that frequent meeting is signal of both audit committee director liability 
concern and audit committee diligence. They note that the number of audit committee meetings is a rough tool 
for diligence because, “It does not provide any indication of the work accomplished during these meetings ....” 
They also added, however, that audit committees who do not meet, or meet only a small number of times are 
unlikely to be effective monitors. Reference [25] found that more meetings are positively associated with the 
presence of outside directors. 
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Reference [31] investigated the association between the number of audit committee meetings and the likelihood 
of financial reporting problems. They concluded that firms with financial reporting problems had less frequent 
audit committee meetings. Reference 50] examined the relationship between the audit committee diligence, 
measured by the number of meetings, and the performance of the firm. He found that the relation remains 
vague; everything depends on costs associated to guarantee the meetings of audit committees. In addition, 
Archambeault and DeZoort [13] found a significant and positive association between the number of audit 
committee meetings and the audit quality (more likely to use a specialist auditor and less likely to commit a 
suspicious auditor switch). 
More recently, Reference [34] examined the characteristics of diligent Audit committees. We attempt to capture 
audit committee diligence by measuring the incremental meeting activity of audit committees. They compute 
diligence by dividing the number of annual audit committee meetings on the four meetings recommended by the 
BRC. 
The BRC [4,48], recommend a frequency of at least four audit committee meetings per year. In this perspective 
here in Tunisia, the Audit committee meets, on summons of his president, at least four times per year and it meet 
sufficiently often to monitor important issues. 
2.2. The planning of the works and the quality of the returned reports 
The BRC [4,28,14,15,40,41,16] underline that the process of the audit committee is divided into three phases: a 
preparatory phase of the audit committee meetings, a phase of meeting and a phase of conclusion of the audit 
committee meetings. 
During the first phase, the audit committee and the participants in the meetings (internal auditors, external 
auditors and financial management) are going to prepare and to complete documentation (agenda, minutes and 
information’s supplied to audit committee members) [52]. This documentation must be enough clear and 
synthetic to facilitate their understanding and their apprehension by the administrators. Reference [50] showed 
that meetings of audit committee can be effective if a right amount of quality documentation is distributed in 
advance in a timely manner. Hence each member can review before the meetings. On the bases of all these 
information’s they will elaborate a detailed agenda containing the most important issue. Reference [32: 243] 
stated that « a very crowded agenda may impose pressures on the audit committee that limited full debate and 
his constraint may be used to the advantage of particular participants ». In Tunisia, the secretary to the audit 
committee (usually internal auditors) formally prepares the agenda and minutes of meeting (The circular of the 
Tunisian Central Bank No. 06/2011 [7]. Generally, during this first phase, they exist informal contacts between 
the administrators and the internal, external auditors or even the members of the financial management 
([51,45]). 
According to Reference [46], during the meetings of the audit committee, the financial director, manager, 
internal auditor and the external auditor make presentation. On the basis of the examined documentation and the 
oral presentations, the audit committee raise questions and draw conclusions. Reference [42] recommended that 
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time allocation should be sufficient enough to allow the committee to accomplish its agenda. As Reference 
[33:247] observed « The structure and timing of meetings form part of the ceremonial of audit committee 
meetings and are set by participants. They may inhibit spontaneity despite the insistence of interviewees on the 
atmosphere of open discussion with the opportunity for members to ask question, such questioning is only 
enabled within specific constraints. » 
Finally, the president of the audit committee proposed a report of the works to the board of directors. This report 
must be synthetic and transparent. Section 61 of the circular in credit institutions n° 2006 – 19 states that « The 
audit committee reports regularly to the Board of directors or to the Supervisory board of the exercise of its 
mission. it puts back to the Board of directors or to the Supervisory board before the meeting dedicated to the 
approval of the annual financial statements, an annual report. A copy of this report is sent to the Central Bank of 
Tunisia … » 
It should be noted that The French Institute of the Administrators [20] studied the relation board of directors - 
audit committee, and he recommended in his report of July 22nd, 2010, that: 
• The reports deals with the activities, key issues and major recommendations to the board of directors; 
• The reports are formalized on the agenda of board of directors meetings;  
• Meetings of board of directors have adequate time to allow the committee to present its activities ; 
• The audit committee informs the board of directors of the possible dysfunctions of the internal controls 
systems and risk management and the significant weaknesses of internal controls.  
To be effective, the audit committee has to report regularly, to the board of directors, the goals of its missions 
and to inform it immediately about any coming up difficulties. 
2.3. The audit committee self-assessment 
The Audit committee self-assessment is a method of obtaining an assessment from all the parties involved in the 
audit committee. It is important to obtain inputs from all the members, the chief audit executive, accounting 
officer, chief financial officer and external audit [12: 216]. According to Reference [27] " a regular Audit 
committee self-assessment allows us make sure that audit committee respect the charter and its adequacy in 
relation to the evolution of the company. This self-assessment can concern its efficiency, the relevance of the 
charter contents, its working programs and its communication policy. De Samblanx [36] asserted that «The 
Audit committee self-assessment can be made on the basis of a questionnaire prepared by the audit committee or 
confided to an external specialist. The results of this evaluation will be discussed by the board of directors ".The 
questionnaire measured the effectiveness of the audit committee and the performance of its duties in terms of 
legislation and best practice [12]. 
The weight given to certain elements, at the time of the self-assessment, will be influenced in particular by: 
• The audit committee charter; 
• The entity strategy as well as its risk assessment system; 
International Journal of Sciences: Basic and Applied Research (IJSBAR)(2016) Volume 28, No  1, pp 1-15 
6 
 
• The environment of control; 
• The results of the previous self-assessments; 
• The maturity degree of the audit committee; 
• The opinion of the shareholders and the rating agencies as for the entity performances of regarding 
corporate governance; 
• The current operational and economic factors. 
According to [27], the results of the self-assessment and any new action plan must be communicated with the 
board of directors. The board of directors will have to estimate the audit committee performance and its 
efficiency, every year. 
2.4. The risk of "overload" 
Audit committees risk to face an overload of tasks. This overload tasks is due to the increase of responsibilities 
of the audit committee, this could harm their efficiency [2]. Indeed, spots made by audit committees require a 
considerable work volume (preparation, meeting, reports). Besides, Reference [24] asserted that the risk of 
overload can lead to three negative effects: 
• The efforts and the energy of the audit committee can be dissipated in so many directions, what could 
return the audit committee more and more occupied, but less and less effective; 
•  Competent administrators can refuse to be a member in the audit committee;  
•  The disciplinary or penal risk increases with the increase of the number and the importance of the 
responsibilities. 
The effective audit committee has to concentrate on high-risk areas and must not be buried in reams of reports 
and detailed examination of documents. 
3. The construction of the measurement scale of the audit committee diligence 
The literature study is supplemented by an empirical study where by a questionnaire was compiled by internal 
auditors in Tunisia. A questionnaire was developed and directly distributed during 2014. Our study used the 
methodology developed by Churchill [18]. 
In front of the absence of the researches initiators on the subject, we went deeper into our approach by realizing: 
• A thorough review of the academic and professional literature examining audit committees diligence. 
This review integrates the codes of the good governance, the reports, the texts and the laws. 
• An interview with internal auditors and administrators. This Interview allowed us to obtain more 
information susceptible to describe the audit committee diligence. This technique of interview is often 
recommended by the professionals to define the constructed domain and the purification of items. 
[18,43]. 
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We realized six interviews with four internal auditors and two members of an audit committee. With this group, 
we established a list of items measuring the audit committee diligence. On the basis of this list of items, a 
questionnaire was elaborated for the internal auditors of companies listed on the Tunisian stock exchange in 
order to focus on their appreciation of the importance of the items. We selected a Likert 5 point scale. The use of 
internal auditor’s population is justified by the good experience that he has with the audit committee. From their 
work and meeting with audit committees, the internal auditor can have a good knowledge of audit committee 
process. 
The exploratory and confirmatory Factor Analysis are designed from two quantitative studies respectively with 
15 internal auditors and 71 internal auditors. In the first study we identified the factorial structure of the 
measurement scales of the audit committee diligence. The second has for objective to test the stability of this 
structure on an internal auditor’s second sample. We so subjected the measurement scales to the reliability test 
(Alpha de Cronbach and test Rho de Dillon-Goldstein) and in the exploratory factor analysis (test of Kaiser, 
Meyer and Olkin « KMO »).  
To obtain reliable and valid measurement scales for the audit committee diligence, we applied Confirmatory 
Factor Analysis with Partial Least Squares. Factorial validity in PLS is divided into convergent validity and 
discriminant validity [18,49]. Both of them are constituents of a larger scientific measurement concept known as 
construct validity [10].  
Gefen and Straub [8:93] specified that « Convergent validity is shown when each measurement item correlates 
strongly with its assumed theoretical construct. ». This validity is shown when two things happen:  
• The correlation between the items and its latent variable is greater than 0,7 [5].  
• The average variance extracted (AVE) is greater than 0,5 [8]. The AVE measures the variance captured 
by a latent construct. 
Gefen and Straub [8] defined also Discriminant validity could be shown when each measurement item correlates 
weakly with all other constructs except for the one to which it is theoretically associated . This validity is shown 
when the square root of every AVE is much larger than any correlation among any pair of latent constructs. 
4. The results and discussion 
4.1. The results of the exploratory phase 
The results of the exploratory phase show that the audit committee diligence is multidimensional (KMO= 
0,746). The measurement scales present a satisfactory reliability with Cronbach Alpha greater than 0, 5 [5]. 
Also, the different items present high “loading” with their related factorial focuses.  
The factorial analysis shows that measurement standards, that we initially proposed, can be represented by two 
factorial axes. The specific values associated with the dimensions identified explain 72,467% of the total 
variance. 
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 So, we can identify two main factors: 
* Audit committee Functioning (57,721%) 
* Evaluation of the audit committee Functioning (14,747%) 
The table 1 summarise the results of the exploratory analysis. 
 
Table 1: Factorial structure of the measurement scales of the audit committee diligence 
 
ITEMS 
COMPONENTS 
the audit 
committee  
Functioning 
Evaluation of 
the audit 
committee 
functioning 
The frequency of formal meetings of the Audit Committee is sufficient to fulfill 
its responsibilities. 
0,765 
 
The audit committee organizes several meeting with the internal, the external 
auditors and financial management in private 
0,933 
 
Meetings’ lengths allow the committee to accomplish its agenda. 0,834 
 
The audit committee leans on a detailed agenda and supporting materials 0,930 
 
The deadline is sufficient between the transmission of the material to the audit 
committee members and the meetings. 
0,856 
 
The material given to the audit committee members are enough clear and 
synthetic. 
0,873 
 
All the members can express their opinions freely and in a autonomous way in 
the meetings 
0,716 
 
Audit committee reports regularly on its activities, key issues and major 
recommendations to the board of directors; 
0,859 
 
The audit committee is in front of an overload tasks -0,596 
 
A regular Audit committee self-assessment 
 
0,812 
The results of the self-assessment must be communicated with the board of 
directors. The board of directors will have to estimate the audit committee 
performance, every year. 
 
0,756 
Specific values (λ) 6,349 1,622 
Explained variance 57,721% 14,747% 
Cronbach α 0,886 0,863 
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4.2. The results of the confirmative phase 
4.2.1. Reliability of the Constructs 
The measurement scales present a satisfactory reliability with Rho de Dillon-Goldstein test greater than 0, 7 
[48]. See table 2. 
Table 2: Reliability of the measurement scales of the audit committee diligence 
Components Rho de Dillon-Goldstein test 
Criterion of validity Reliability if Rho de Dillon-Goldstein test > 0,7 
Audit committee Functioning 0,908 
evaluation of the audit committee functioning 0,936 
 
4.2.2. Convergent validity after Bootstrap procedure 
The convergent validity after Bootstrap procedure is admitted because VME is greater than 0, 5.  
These results are supported by those of the tests of the correlation between the items and its latent variable 
presented in the table 3. 
4.2.3. Discriminant validity 
The AVE is represented as the bold and underlined diagonal elements. The off diagonal elements in Table 4 
represent the correlations in squared between the constructs.  
To establish discriminant validity further, the diagonal elements must be greater than the off diagonal elements 
for the same row and columns, not the AVE value itself.  
The AVE analysis showed very strong discriminant validity for all sub constructs, further confirming. See table 
4. 
5.  Conclusion 
This paper has demonstrated that audit committee literature provides little clarity about audit committee activity, 
and in consequence, discussion of their diligence is limited and inclusive. This paper complements the audit 
committee diligence literature by the conception and the validation of the measurement scales of the audit 
committee diligence. 
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Table 3: Convergent validity after Bootstrap procedure 
 
Table 4: Discriminant validity “Test of Fornell and Larcker [5])” 
Components Audit committee 
Functioning 
Evaluation of the audit 
committee functioning 
Criterion of validity                 AVE ˃Cor2 
Audit committee functioning 0,682*  
Evaluation of the audit committee functioning 0,150 0,878* 
*The diagonal of the table indicates the AVE for every factor. Other values concern the squares of the 
correlations enter both factors. 
 Audit committee 
Functioning 
Evaluation of the 
audit committee 
Functioning 
Criterion of validity 
convergent validity if the correlation 
between the items and factors> 0,7 
The frequency of formal meetings of the Audit Committee is sufficient to fulfill 
its responsibilities. 
0,829 
 
The audit committee organizes several meeting with the internal, the external 
auditors and financial management in private 
0,892 
 
Meetings’ lengths allow the committee to accomplish its agenda. 0,821 
 
The audit committee leans on a detailed agenda and supporting materials 0,880 
 
The deadline is sufficient between the transmission of the material to the audit 
committee members and the meetings. 
0,800 
 
The material given to the audit committee members are enough clear and 
synthetic. 
0,834 
 
All the members can express their opinions freely and in a autonomous way in 
the meetings 
0,706 
 
Audit committee reports regularly on its activities, key issues and major 
recommendations to the board of directors; 
0,846 
 
The audit committee is in front of an overload tasks -0,758 
 
A regular Audit committee self-assessment 
 
0,916 
The results of the self-assessment must be communicated with the board of 
directors. The board of directors will have to estimate the audit committee 
performance, every year. 
 
0,944 
Criterion of validity VME> 0,5 
VME 0,682 0,878 
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From a rigorous process for the development of measurement scales of the audit committee diligence, we 
realized several factorial analyses (exploratory and confirmatory) via too samples of the internal auditors. The 
results of qualitative and quantitative studies allowed us to identify 11 indicators of the audit committee 
diligence grouped into too dimensions: The Audit committee functioning and the evaluation of the audit 
committee functioning. 
After having analysed and discussed the main finding of the measurement scale that can be used to evaluate the 
audit committee diligence of the Tunisian companies. We can conclude that the measurement scales of the audit 
committee diligence will be of a considerable utility for the researches concerning the good governance and 
particularly those who aim at examining the audit global process. 
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